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Curating Risk, Selling Safety? Fear of Crime, Responsibilisation and 
the Surveillance School Economy   
 
Emmeline Taylor 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Radicalisation. School shooters. Paedophiles. Obesity. Vandalism. Drug abuse. 
Cyberbullying. These are just some examples of contemporary anxieties that schools have, 
through a process of responsibilisation, been tasked with addressing in some form in recent 
years. As a result, schools have undergone rapid growth in securitisation in a bid to placate 
fears, whether real, imagined or curated. The voracity with which new modes of security and 
surveillance technologies are beginning to shape the school campus continues to gather 
momentum as new narratives of risk emerge to freight their supposed necessity into the 
education sector. Techno-solutions search for problems to address and find the school a 
fertile ground on which to sow concerns about a broad range of societal issues and, 
sometimes imagined, threats, from terrorism to drug use, abduction to bullying. The 
neophiliac approach to technological surveillance in schools has resulted in it becoming a 
particularly lucrative market for vendors with safety to sell.  
 
Mapping the ascension of three distinct phenomenon in schools: ‘anti-radicalisation’ online 
toolkits and software; closed circuit television (CCTV) and randomised suspicionless drug 
testing (whilst recognising that there are countless others), this chapter traces the emergence 
of these seemingly dissimilar phenomenon to reveal that the driving forces and processes that 
underpin them are remarkably similar. Multifarious motivations exist for the vast array of 
ostensibly idiosyncratic mechanisms of security, but the manipulation of fears and anxieties 
by private entities as part of the neoliberal project is a recurrent theme. Challenging the most 
prosaic of explanations - a desire to enhance the safety and wellbeing of schoolchildren – the 
narratives of fear that circulate modern schools, and schoolchildren, are examined. The 
central thesis of this chapter is that the neoliberal project underscores a trilogy of distinct but 
interrelated processes that are driving school (hyper)securitisation; (i) responsibilisation and 
the shifting functions of schooling in postindustrial society; (ii) the cultivation of fear and 
construction of schools as sites of danger and risk; and, (iii) the flourishing surveillance 
school economy.  
 
The chapter is broadly organised into three sections. First, it provides a brief background to 
the anatomy of Surveillance School, before moving on to examine the modern day fears and 
anxieties that circulate it. Drawing on three examples of school surveillance to illustrate the 
arguments presented (anti-radicalisation online monitoring, CCTV and school based drug 
testing) the section examines some of the similar themes that link these distinct phenomena. 
The final section explores the emergent school surveillance economy. It is argued that 
manufacturers and suppliers of surveillance and security equipment leverage from the 
responsibilisation of schools in order to cultivate anxieties and risks, thus ensuring a lucrative 
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market for their products. Behaviour in school is increasingly viewed through a criminal lens 
that requires monitoring and discipline to be outsourced to external ‘expert’ providers who, 
through the neoliberal philosophy of managerialism, are argued to provide a more efficient, 
effective and specialised service. 
 
The Surveillance School 
 
Despite the widespread assertion that we are now living in a surveillance society, there is 
actually very little awareness of the existence, intensity and impacts of diverse mechanisms 
of surveillance that schoolchildren are subject to. Elsewhere I, and others, have detailed 
accounts of the prevalence, use and objectives of multifarious security and surveillance 
technologies in schools, but here, they are condensed into a brief overview in order to focus 
on the driving forces that underpin them (for more detailed accounts of the diverse 
materiality of surveillance in schools see Gard and Lupton, 2017; Hope, forthcoming; 
Leaton-Gray, forthcoming; Monahan and Torres, 2010; Taylor, 2010a; 2010b; 2012; 2017; 
Williamson, 2017). Overt and covert technologies including visual, biometric, spatial, and 
algorithmic make up the assemblage of surveillance practices currently used in schools. 
CCTV and webcams, iris scanning, palm vein readers and Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) are finding their way on to campus. Many schools have 
introduced airport-style security arches and hand-held metal detector wands to search young 
people and visitors as they enter the school gates. Some schools, particularly in the US, have 
introduced suspicionless randomised drug and alcohol testing (DAT) or use police sniffer 
dogs to search students and their possessions. Underscored by zero-tolerance policies filtered 
down from criminal justice, some argue that, in tandem, these approaches to discipline are 
swelling suspension and expulsion rates and producing hyper-securitised education spaces. In 
the most extreme scenarios, such practices serve to forge a school-to-prison pipeline for the 
most marginalised and excluded (Devine, 1996; Nolan and Anyon, 2004). However, whilst 
generalised depictions are prevalent in the literature, it is important to recognise the 
geographical and cultural heterogeneity of school security, as sociocultural dynamics 
interplay with specific events in some countries, influencing the acceptability and rejection of 
security apparatus in the education context (see Taylor, 2016 for discussion of the 
sociocultural heterogeneity of Surveillance Schools). 
 
Fear of crime and the construction of dangerous schools 
 
Anxieties about schools as sites of danger and risk have generated what Furedi describes as a 
‘culture of fear’, underpinned by broader anxieties of crime embedded in contemporary social 
and political structures (Simon, 2007). Such fears, perpetuated by the media, quickly become 
politicised and schools, in their capacity as loco parentis, are tasked with formulating 
adequate responses to safeguard schoolchildren and the society within which they are 
situated. As schools have increasingly become responsibilised to respond to a broad range of 
societal ills and concerns, including terrorism, drug abuse, obesity and violence, they have 
introduced evermore-invasive technologies and practices so as to be seen to be doing 
something. Against a backdrop of devolved state power (Hope, 2015), neoliberal schools 
have become entrusted, sometimes even legislated, with the responsibility to counter the 
varied problems that beset contemporary society. Ill equipped to respond unaided to the 
numerous requirements and demands, the private sector is on hand to provide a range of 
sophisticated and high-tech ‘solutions’ even when there is very little evidence to suggest they 
can fulfil the objectives they claim to be able to address. Monahan has provided a very telling 
example of how high profile events are transformed into a narrative that demands greater 
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security over other measures. In relation to the high school shooting at Columbine in 1999, he 
notes that despite CCTV being present on campus but unable to dissuade or prevent the 
tragedy; ‘the terrifying shooting has become a key reference point in justifying increased 
surveillance and security systems in schools throughout the United States’ (2006: 109). 
Similarly, following the shootings at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut in 
2012, some US states began implementing laws to enable teachers and school staff to carry 
guns with programs such as the Armed Teacher Training Program. Policy discussions 
following such tragic events often focus on implementing more security (CCTV, metal 
detectors, onsite police officers, and so on) rather than seeking opportunities to implement 
responsive and restorative practices (Kupchik et al., 2016). Similarly, Muzzati (2004: 143) 
has warned that this results in missed opportunities to discuss the ‘culture of fear and 
violence, alienation, hyper-masculinity, frustration, marginalisation’ and a host of other 
salient factors. Such reactive approaches fail to acknowledge or address the underlying 
causes of school violence, or recognise that, at times, exclusionary and divisive measures 
may further isolate or marginalise the very people that are at risk. Similar concerns have been 
voiced in relation school-based anti-radicalisation monitoring and randomised drug and 
alcohol testing, as will be outlined below.   
 
The rhetoric of dangerous and risky schools not only drives a process in which fear and risk 
are drawn upon to rationalise and justify surveillance, but assists in extending the reach of 
penal state apparatus and private business into schools. Media narratives fuel anxieties and 
fears. Athleide and Michalowski (1999) note that although the exact focus changes over time, 
the media creates a ‘discourse of fear’, purveying a language that in itself is saturated with a 
vocabulary of risk and danger. They highlight in their analysis that children in particular are 
increasingly the focus of such narratives and this can go someway towards explaining the 
emergence of metal detectors, CCTV, sniffer dogs and RFID in schools. Importantly, and as 
articulated by Smith (1986: 128, italics in original), ‘this is not to say that the press 
determines public opinion but rather to argue that it “sets the agenda” which frames such 
opinion’. In other words, the media generates and reflects issues for the public to be 
concerned about. Such discourses of risk and fear of crime are compelling. As Athleide and 
Michalowski (1999: 475) have argued ‘when fear is the prevailing framework for looking at 
social issues, then other competing frames and discourses lose out’. As such, a “what if..?” 
(Furedi) mentality paves the way for hyper-securitisation, and a “if it saves just one child 
mantra” trumps any reasoned or rational debate about the best way to safeguard or protect 
schoolchildren and teachers (Taylor, 2013).  
 
Curating risky classrooms: An analysis of three case studies  
 
Hypersensitivity to school violence is just one of the avenues by which corporations can 
implant themselves into the lucrative school market, often bringing with them measures that 
are outwardly designed to protect young people but that can actually stifle and stultify their 
growth and development. Three seemingly distinct and unique approaches to manage 
contemporary fears about schoolchildren and schools are outlined here as a means of tracing 
the ways in which similar rhetoric underpins their emergence. The three examples are anti-
radicalisation online monitoring software, CCTV, and the use of suspicionless drug and 
alcohol testing in schools underscored by zero tolerance approaches to school discipline. The 
analysis emphasises how understanding the symbiotic relationship between fear of crime and 
the surveillance school economy can assist with documenting the emergence of otherwise 
seemingly nuanced and idiosyncratic phenomena. 
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(i) Anti-radicalisation monitoring in schools 
Schools have been tasked, legally in some countries, to respond to complex social issues such 
as terrorism, driving an agenda of securitisation and surveillance in education. In the United 
Kingdom, The Education Act 2002 placed a duty on local education authorities, maintained 
schools and further education institutions to exercise their functions with a view to 
safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children. Following on from this, under section 26 
of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, ‘The Prevent duty’1 was introduced which 
mandates that specified authorities (including schools) must, ‘in the exercise of their 
functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. In 
a clear example of responsibilisation, in England, it was outlined in a report by the 
Department for Education (DfE) that:  
Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of the 
schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to 
protecting children from other harms … Schools and childcare providers can also 
build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and 
enabling them to challenge extremist views. (DfE, 2015: 5) 
The Prevent duty has manifest in a number of different approaches, including assessing the 
risk of children being drawn into terrorism, teacher training, such as the Home Office devised 
Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP), and IT policies that include filtering and 
monitoring of online activity. School staff and childcare providers are obliged to refer any 
vulnerable or ‘at risk’ students to the Channel programme, a multi-agency programme that 
focuses on identifying signs of radicalisation and those susceptible to terrorist ideologies and 
activities, and providing early intervention. Ahead of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015 being enacted on 1 July 2015, companies such as such as Impero, Future Digital and 
Securus began to produce ‘anti-radicalisation software’ aimed at monitoring student online 
activity and flag extremist-related language. The software included glossaries of key trigger 
words and phrases such as ‘YODO’ (you only die once), ‘jihadi bride’ and ‘jihobbyist’ 
alongside functions including the ability to store screenshots of any online activity that is of 
interest or concern. Initially some of these companies, such as Impero, provided the software 
gratis in a series of pilots in England and the US. This has become a proven marketing 
strategy in relation to school security and surveillance marketing, as previously outlined in 
relation to biometric scanners:  
Manufacturers and suppliers can be seen to kick-start the surveillance arms race by 
donating equipment to run pilot programmes. There are many examples of seemingly 
benevolent gestures by vendors to assist the school in ensuring the safety of pupils 
and staff. Such loss leaders can serve to open up new markets for surveillance-
security products and induce demand amongst schools (Taylor, 2013).  
                                                        
1 In the United Kingdom, The Prevent strategy forms part of the counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST 
which has the central aim to ‘to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’. CONTEST 
utilises a range of techniques and approaches, one of which is requiring schools and their teachers to 
look for signs of radicalisation.  
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In terms of the anti-radicalisation software, just six months later the UK education secretary 
stated that schools must monitor students’ internet usage for signs of radicalisation or 
extremist views thus cementing the need for schools to outsource their responsibilised duties 
to private companies. Thus a by-product of the statutory safeguarding legislation imposed 
upon schools is that private companies are influencing what should be considered legitimate 
topics for debate and discussion in the classroom. 
The Prevent duty places a considerable preemptive responsibility on teachers and school staff 
that leads to the ‘social sorting’ of schoolchildren into categories of risk. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, its oversimplified approach to identifying those at risk of radicalisation and 
terrorist activity, has led to the prejudicial and stigmatising treatment of ethnic minorities. For 
example, it has emerged that some schools are only monitoring black and ethnic minority 
students (Newman, 2015), an approach that in itself can clearly be counterproductive, further 
compounding the marginalization and stigmatization of some children. Imposing a legal 
obligation on teachers to monitor their pupil’s online activity can also introduce a climate of 
mistrust and suspicion into schools, undermining any possibility of genuine discussion and 
understanding of current affairs and political discourses. As has been found in relation to 
CCTV, school-based surveillance can have a ‘chilling effect’ (Taylor, 2010), whereby in this 
instance children are too worried about the implications of researching global events online in 
case they are flagged as a potential future terrorist. Aside from the fact that school based 
monitoring is likely to be an ineffective means of identifying signs for radicalization, it also 
has the potential to actually create more insecurity by missing genuine opportunities for 
developing critical thinking skills, the ability to question religious authority and challenge 
ideologies. Allen (2015: n.p) argues that surveilling students for signs of radicalization has: 
[T]he potential to reinforce the very basis of those extremist narratives that the new 
duties have been introduced to tackle: that “Islam” and “the West” can never coexist. 
If … Muslim students feel increasingly pressurised, marginalised and excluded as a 
result of these new duties, then the law is likely to reinforce rather than counter the 
very same arguments that are used to justify the transition towards being radical and 
extreme. 
The use of classroom surveillance as a means of ‘spotting the future terrorist’ will only serve 
to alienate schoolchildren and create a climate of suspicion and mistrust. But also sits 
uncomfortably with the active recruitment of marginalized and disadvantaged schoolchildren 
into the armed forces (Johnson, 2017).  
(ii) CCTV  
 
CCTV is on of the most recognizable forms of surveillance technology, and the education 
sector has emerged as a key user of visual monitoring. Again whilst recognizing the 
heterogeneity of surveillance technologies, schools around the globe have invested vast 
amounts of resource into the introduction of CCTV to the school campus. In the US, more 
than 20 years ago, it was estimated that a quarter of public schools had installed CCTV, and 
that nearly all of these (94 per cent) had CCTV in the classrooms. Since then, a survey in 
2009-2010 revealed that 84 per cent of high schools, 73 per cent of middle schools, and 51 
per cent of primary schools used security cameras (Robers et al, 2012). Given the 
securitisation of schools in the US, particularly in the context of several high profile school  
shootings, the use of CCTV in US schools is likely to be close to, if not, universal across 
school campuses. Schools in Britain present a similar picture. In the absence of concrete data 
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on CCTV usage, in 2012, Big Brother Watch issued Freedom of Information (FOIs) requests 
to 4,092 secondary schools requesting details on the number and location of cameras. The 
FOIs elicited responses from 2,107 schools, 90 per cent of which had installed CCTV, with 
an overall average ratio of one camera to every 38 pupils. Some schools had much higher 
levels of coverage with a ratio of one camera for every five pupils. Nearly 10 per cent of 
2,107 schools responding to their FOI request had CCTV installed in ‘changing rooms and 
bathrooms’ (2012). The Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL) found similar rates of 
CCTV usage in their survey of 249 primary and secondary school teachers and found that 85 
percent reported that there were CCTV cameras in the school where they worked. Similar to 
the US, the number of schools using CCTV in Britain is likely to be close to 100 percent.  
 
Influenced by the work of Muller and Boos (2004), Hope (2009) classified the reasons 
extolled for the implementation of school CCTV into three categories: (1) access control 
(primarily concerned with protecting physical boundaries from external threats); (2) conduct 
control (through direct physical intervention responding to real-time observation, as well as 
through self-regulation), and; (3) evidence gathering (for investigating disciplinary events 
and criminal acts). However, it should be recognized that often the reasons offered to justify 
or explain the implementation of CCTV do not always tally with how it is then operated in 
reality. For example, despite a pervasive presumption that CCTV is used to prevent serious 
crime, through a process of ‘surveillance creep’, whereby surveillance practices ‘justified for 
one purpose find new applications not originally part of their mandate’ (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 2006:18), it has found many non-criminal uses. Some schools use ‘video footage 
to root out troublemakers … and thugs among their students’ although they were originally 
‘meant to protect school property after hours’ (McDougall and Danks, 2012 cited in Taylor, 
2016), whereas others use them to invigilate exams (BBC News, 2008), assess teacher 
performance (BBC News, 2009a), and even in a bid to address the ‘misuse of paper towels 
and soap’ in students’ toilets (BBC News 2009b).  
 
Similar to the use of CCTV in other contexts, the uptake of school surveillance is often 
driven by a state-based agenda that incentivises the use of surveillance practices through 
funding. For example, in Australia, the Schools Security Programme, was introduced in 2007 
to provide ‘non-recurrent funding for security infrastructure, such as closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) systems, lighting and fences, and for the cost of employing security guards’ 
(Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.). Since 2007 the program has provided $35 million for 
security measures in non-government schools and preschools. Despite empirical evidence 
that the use of CCTV in the classroom can have a detrimental impact on education (McCahill 
and Finn, 2010; Taylor, 2010, 2013, 2017), as well as suggestions that it is ineffective at 
solving the issues it has been purportedly introduced to, such as tackle bullying and prevent 
violent attacks in school, it continues to be installed as the de facto surveillance-security 
mechanism in schools. In part due to misconceptions regarding its efficacy, as well as its 
considerable symbolic status as a crime control measure.  
 
(iii) Drug and alcohol testing  
 
Drugs and alcohol can be detected via various means including samples of hair, sweat, saliva, 
blood and urine and, as such, biological methods to determine substance use have become 
increasingly popular in a number of public and private sectors, including education. A US 
national survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015), found 
that in 2014 more than a quarter (26.6%) of US high schools conducted some form of student 
drug testing. Of that figure, almost half (45.9%) of schools conducted drug tests randomly 
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among members of specific groups, such as athletes and students who participate in other 
extracurricular activities as part of anti-doping objectives. However, drug testing initially 
required for those taking part in extracurricular activities, and particularly sports, was soon 
followed by recommendations to test all students as a matter of course (ONDCP, 2002). A 
study by DuPont et al (2013) revealed that 29.5% of high schools with a DAT program 
conducted random drug tests with the entire school population as the sampling frame. 
 
The prevalence of drug testing programs outside the US is difficult to ascertain. Across 
Europe, a small-scale study of suspicion-based drug testing conducted in 2004 by the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction reported drug testing programs in 
schools in Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, and the UK, as well as more formal drug testing 
programs in the Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (DuPont et al, 2013).  
 
Research on DAT testing in schools remains limited, but that which has been done suggests 
that it is ineffective, and at times, detrimental to the well being of young people. Yamaguchi 
et al (2003) analysed the data of 76,000 students across hundreds of schools, between 1998 
and 2001. They found that for most students surveyed in the study, school drug testing was 
not associated with either the prevalence or frequency of student drug use. Similarly, 
Goldberg et al (2007) conducted a randomized controlled study of a single cohort of high 
school athletes from five high schools with a DAT policy and six schools with a deferred 
policy. They periodically assessed the impact of the program by means of voluntary and 
confidential questionnaires. They found that ‘student-athletes from intervention and control 
schools did not differ in past 1-month use of illicit drug or a combination of drug and alcohol 
use at any of the four follow-up periods’ (2007: 421). Furthermore, and somewhat 
paradoxically, they reported that DAT athletes believed less in the benefits of testing and 
were less likely to think that testing was a reason not to use drugs than the control group. 
They concluded that ‘more research is needed before DAT is considered an effective 
deterrent for school-based athletes’ (Goldberg et al (2007: 421). In a review of ‘all relevant 
issues involved in drug detection and screening in the school setting’ (Roche et al., 2008: ix), 
a report commissioned by the Australian National Council on Drugs (ANCD) highlighted 
numerous practical, financial, ethical and legal reasons, and warned against drug testing 
impacting negatively on young people, particularly high-risk and vulnerable groups of 
children. The report concluded that ‘overall, the body of evidence examined indicates a 
strong case to be made against drug detection and screening strategies being utilised in the 
school setting’ (Ibid.).  
 
Despite the growing body of evidence suggesting that school-based drug and alcohol testing 
is not an effective or appropriate way to address substance use amongst young people, 
schools internationally continue to implement this approach, often in conjunction with zero 
tolerance approaches to drug use, and more broadly, discipline. The vast profits that can be 
generated from such a policy go some way to explaining this phenomenon. As Kern et al 
(2006) assert, ‘the current push to increase drug testing comes from the drug testing industry 
as well as well-intentioned educators and parents…’ In this context, it becomes clear that the 
introduction of drug testing in schools is more a reflection of responsibility being devolved to 
schools that, in turn, are entrusting private companies to manage the issue on their behalf. As 
such, far from an evidenced-based solution to a proven health issue, school drug testing is 
borne of governmental imperatives and market logics.  
 
The School Surveillance Economy  
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The ‘Surveillance School economy is booming’ and numerous vendors are now seeking to 
access the lucrative education market (Taylor, 2013). Illustrating this, a survey of the security 
industry in the US found that the education sector was the third fastest growing market with a 
15 per cent annual increase in sales (cited in Fuentes, 2013: 133). Many opportunities it 
would appear are being curated in order to commodify behavioural control and school safety 
through surveillance apparatus, including the three examples of online monitoring, CCTV 
and suspicionless drug-testing elucidated in this chapter, amongst a swathe of other 
technological mechanisms. The examples outlined can be viewed as symptomatic of a 
broader shift towards ‘surveillance capitalism’; a ‘new form of information capitalism [that] 
aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market 
control’ (Zuboff, 2015: 75). Several scholars have identified how the capitalist enterprise 
excavates a channel from the development of high-end military apparatus to their diffuse use 
in everyday environments (Bogard 1998; Casella, 2006; Giddens, 1985; Haggerty and 
Ericson, 1999), including schools. Technologies such as CCTV, metal detectors, and online 
surveillance that are typically associated with law enforcement and the military are 
increasingly finding that schools provide an attractive economic niche. As I have argued 
elsewhere ‘Big Brother is big business and there are countless vendors with safety to sell’ 
(Taylor, 2013). The rhetoric of dangerous and risky schools is politically expedient in 
furthering the agenda to outsource functions to private entities, or to privatise education 
entirely. As Casella (2010: 84) notes: ‘we hear the same old free market story: for various 
reasons public officials cannot provide safety, or the safety they provide is inferior to what 
the private sector can provide, so the private sector must step in and pick up the slack.’ These 
are not benign or value-free processes, but viewed through the prism of the neoliberal project, 
infused with political and economical ideologies that are radically changing educational 
institutions.  
 
Conclusion: Responsibilising schools and capitalising on fear  
 
Often ushered in with promises of safeguarding children, surveillance technologies can 
provide feelings of security and reassurance, but they can also, paradoxically, conjure 
feelings of anxiety, loss of privacy, and mistrust; instilling a sense of fear amongst 
schoolchildren by signifying that there is something ‘out there’ that they need to be protected 
from. They can, additionally, create the very problems they have supposedly been 
implemented to tackle. It has long been recognized that ‘the spread of fear and other local 
problems provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime’ 
(Skogan, 1986: 215). Or in other words, ‘fear ends up proving itself’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 
1997: 6). Surveillance in this respect becomes part of a ‘governing process that constructs 
and amplifies particular risk messages’ (Coleman, 2004: 6). The extent of the consequences 
is yet to be fully recognized, but there are clear indicators that the new modality of school 
surveillance is contributing to a reassembling of educational practices as they are increasingly 
shaped by corporate priorities. As the school becomes responsibilised for an ever broadening 
range of social issues and concerns, they in turn, become further enmeshed with corporate 
priorities that expand the surveillance economy.  
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